Abstract. The monadic fragments of first-order Gödel logics are investigated. It is shown that all finite-valued monadic Gödel logics are decidable; whereas, with the possible exception of one (G ↑ ), all infinitevalued monadic Gödel logics are undecidable. For the missing case G ↑ the decidability of an important sub-case, that is well motivated also from an application oriented point of view, is proven. A tight bound for the cardinality of finite models that have to be checked to guarantee validity is extracted from the proof. Moreover, monadic G ↑ , like all other infinite-valued logics, is shown to be undecidable if the projection operator is added, while all finite-valued monadic Gödel logics remain decidable with .
Introduction
Many-valued logics have various applications in computer science (see, e.g., [10] ). They are particularly useful for modeling reasoning with graded notions and vague information. In the latter context, the family of (finite-and infinite-valued) Gödel logics appears as a prominent example. These are the only many-valued logics that are completely specified by the order structure of the underlying set of truth values. This fact characterizes Gödel logics as logics of comparative truth and renders them an important case of so-called fuzzy logics (see [11] ).
Propositional finite-valued Gödel logics were introduced by Gödel [9] to show that intuitionistic logic does not have a characteristic finite matrix. They were generalized by Dummett [7] to an infinite set of truth values. First-order Gödel logic based on the closed unit interval [0, 1] as set of truth values was introduced and axiomatized by Takeuti and Titani in [15] and called "intuitionistic fuzzy logic", there. In a more general view, the truth values for Gödel logics can be taken from any V ⊆ [0, 1] , that contains 0 and 1, and is closed under infima and suprema. (Gödel logic coincides with classical logic for V = {0, 1}.) In contrast to the propositional case, where there is only one infinite-valued Gödel logic with respect to validity, different sets V of truth values determine different first-order Gödel logics G V , in general. As shown in [4] , G V is recursively axiomatizable only when V is either finite or is order isomorphic to [0, 1] or to {0} ∪ [ We investigate monadic Gödel logics, i.e. first-order G V in which all predicate letters are unary (monadic). Many-valued monadic predicates can be interpreted as fuzzy sets and therefore many-valued monadic logics suffice to formalize the central concept of a fuzzy IF-THEN rule, like: "IF A(x) and B(x) THEN C(x)", where the predicates A, B, and C are fuzzy, i.e., they apply to x possibly only to some degree.
We show that all finite-valued monadic Gödel logics are decidable, while for infinite sets V of truth values all monadic Gödel logics are undecidable, with the possible exception of monadic G ↑ , where V = {1 − 1/n : n ≥ 1} ∪ {1}. The missing case, G ↑ , is interesting, since it coincides with the intersection of all monadic finite-valued Gödel logics. Its decidability status remains open. However, we prove the decidability of an important sub-case, that we call the untangled fragment of G ↑ .
The untangled fragment of a logic consists of those (monadic) formulas in which each subformula contains at most one free variable. To appreciate the usefulness of this fragment, notice that its classical counterpart was used in [12] to formalize the knowledge base of the medical expert system CADIAG-1, represented as (classical) IF-THEN rules. This formalization made it possible to prove the decidability of the consistency checking problem in CADIAG-1 and led to a simple algorithm to actually carry out such checks.
Our decision procedure for the untangled fragment of G ↑ also provides a tight bound for the cardinality of finite models that have to be checked to guarantee validity. This bound implies a considerable gain in efficiency for the corresponding fragments of finite-valued Gödel logics (including classical logic). An elegant axiomatization for the untangled fragment of G ↑ can also be extracted from the decision procedure, contrasting the fact that G ↑ is not recursively axiomatizable [3, 4] .
We also investigate monadic Gödel logics extended with the projection operator , see [1] . This operator maps P to the distinguished truth value 1 if the value of P equals 1, and to 0 otherwise, and thus allows to recover classical reasoning inside Gödel logics. The addition of does not affect the decidability of the finite-valued logics, however all infinite-valued monadic Gödel logics, including G ↑ , turn out to be undecidable in presence of , even when restricted to their prenex fragments. Obviously, . I extends every interpretation I, that maps propositional variables into V , uniquely to arbitrary propositional formulas. I satisfies a formula F and is called a model of F if F I = 1; F is valid if all interpretations are models. We identify a logic with its set of valid formulas.
Different choices of V in general induce different logics. The truth functions, above, imply that only the respective order structure, but not the particular arithmetic values of the truth values are relevant for validity or satisfiability. If |V | = n (n ≥ 2) the set of valid formulas is called the n-valued Gödel logic. Obviously, two-valued Gödel logic is classical logic. At the propositional level there is only one infinite-valued Gödel logic G ∞ , which is also the intersection of all finite-valued Gödel logics. Dummett [7] has shown that G ∞ can be axiomatized by adding the linearity axiom
to any Hilbert-style system for intuitionistic logic. Therefore G ∞ is sometimes also called Gödel-Dummett logic or Dummett's LC. More recently G ∞ emerged as one of the main formalizations of fuzzy logics (see, e.g., [11] ). In this context it is very useful to enrich the logics by adding the unary operator with the following meaning [1] :
The situation for infinite sets of truth values gets more interesting at the first-order level. We introduce predicates and quantifiers as follows. Instead of being propositional variables, atomic formulas are now of the form P (t 1 , . . . , t n ), where P is a predicate symbol and t 1 , . . . , t n are terms, where a term, here, is either an (object) variable or a constant symbol. An interpretation I consists of a non-empty domain D and a signature interpretation v I that maps constant symbols and object variables to elements of D. Moreover, v I maps every n-ary predicate symbol P to a function from D n into V . The truth value of an atomic formula P (t 1 , . . . , t n ) is thus defined as
To fix the meaning of quantifiers we define the distribution of a formula A with respect to a free variable x in an interpretation I as distr I (A(x)) = { A(x) I | I ∼ x I}, where I ∼ x I means that I is exactly as I with the possible exception of the domain element assigned to x. The quantifiers correspond to the infimum and supremum, respectively, in the following sense:
Note that the above definition of an interpretation as a pair (D, v I ) covers also classical logic. However, to enhance clarity, we will use (in Section 4, below) ⊥ and instead of 0 and 1, respectively, for the classical truth values.
In the following we investigate (fragments of) first-order Gödel logics, with and without the operator . Every truth value set V , {0, 1} ⊆ V ⊆ [0, 1], that is closed under suprema and infima induces a first-order logic G V over the language without and a logic G V if is present. Standard Gödel logic is G [0,1] ; i.e., the logic over the full real unit interval as truth value set, see, e.g., [11, 15] . We use G n to denote the n-valued first-order Gödel logic for n ≥ 2.
Like in intuitionistic logic, also in Gödel logics (with or without ) quantifiers cannot be shifted arbitrarily. In other words, arbitrary formulas are not equivalent to prenex formulas, in general. However, we have the following (stated in [4] without proof): Proposition 1. The following quantifier shift laws, where x is not free in B, and where Q denotes either ∃ or ∀ (uniformly over a formula) are valid in all Gödel logics:
Proof. Given the truth functions for quantifiers, presented above, it suffices to note that, for all sets of reals A and all reals b the following statements hold.
(In fact almost all of these schemes are already intuitionistically valid.)
Note that the schemes that are dual to (4) and (5) are not valid in general (but are valid in G ↑ and G n , n ≥ 2; see Proposition 3). Counterexamples are readily obtained for standard Gödel logic G [0, 1] .
To emphasize that different sets of valid formulas result from different V , in general, consider the following formula schemes:
Any instance of (8) is satisfied in an interpretation I if and only if the infimum of distr I (A(x)) is a minimum, i.e., an element of distr I (A(x)). Therefore (8) is valid in G ↑ and in any G n , but not, e.g., in
Similarly (9) expresses that every supremum of a distribution is a maximum, with the possible exception of the value 1. Therefore (9) is valid in G ↓ , in G ↑ , and in all G n for n ≥ 2, but not, e.g., in G [0, 1] . In fact there are infinitely many different infinite-valued first-order Gödel logics, according to [4] . The conjecture that there are just countable many different Gödel logics has recently been settled in [5] . G [0, 1] and G [0, 1] are well known to be recursively axiomatizable, see, e.g., [11] . In contrast, G ↑ and G ↓ are not recursively axiomatizable, see [3, 4] . The fact that G ↑ = n≥2 G n also holds at the first-order level, see [4] . However, this is no longer the case if we add the projection operator . In the enriched language, the intersection of all finite-valued Gödel logics is not a Gödel logic:
Proof. Since G n is a proper subset of G m whenever n > m, n≥2 G n cannot coincide with any finite-valued Gödel logic. To show that n≥2 G n also cannot be an infinite-valued Gödel logic, consider the formula
It is valid in all finite-valued Gödel logics and therefore also in n≥2 G n . But not every interpretation I for G ↑ satisfies all instances of (10). Take, e.g., the positive integers as domain of I and let v I (P )(n) = 1 − 1 n for some predicate symbol P . We obtain (∃x)P (x) I = (∃x)P (x) I = 1 and
On the other hand, G ↑ = n≥2 G n ⊂ n≥2 G n and therefore all instances of schemes (8) and (9) are in n≥2 G n . As noted above, this implies that in all interpretations of n≥2 G n every infimum of a distribution is a minimum and every supremum of a distribution is either 1 or a maximum. In other words: if n≥2 G n were identical with some G V , then its set V of truth values could not contain any accumulation point except 1. But all infinite subsets of [0, 1] containing 0 and 1, that satisfy this property are order isomorphic to {1} ∪ {1 − 1 k | k ≥ 1}, which is the case that we have excluded above.
2 Remark 1. Note that we only had to refer to a unary predicate symbol in the above proof. I.e., Proposition 2 holds already for the monadic fragments.
From now on, we will restrict our attention to monadic Gödel logics, i.e., all predicate symbols are unary. G 2 is classical logic and therefore, as is well known, monadic G 2 is decidable, whereas already a single binary predicate symbol leads to undecidability. It is straightforward to generalize this classic result to all finitevalued logics.
Proof. Let A be any monadic formula that is not valid in G n . Hence, there exists an interpretation I based on the set of truth values V = { j n−1 | 0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1} such that A I < 1. Let {P 1 , . . . , P k } be the set of different predicate symbols occurring in A. I induces the following equivalence relation ≡ I on the domain D of I: 
It is straightforward to check that I is well-defined and that A I = A I . This means that A is valid in G n iff it is satisfied in all interpretations with domain {1, . . . , n k }. Since there are at most n k·n k different such interpretations, and since evaluation of formulas over finite domains is computable, we have proved the decidability of G n . 2
Remark 2. Clearly, the 'filtration argument' of the above proof applies to the monadic fragments of arbitrary finite-valued logics, not just of Gödel logics. (In fact, the proof is probably 'folklore'. To render the paper self contained, and since there seems to be no appropriate reference in the literature, we decided to include it here.) Remark 3. It is well known that the bound n k for the cardinality of relevant model domains is optimal in the case n = 2, i.e., for classical logic. Better bounds might be achievable in general; however all such bounds seem to depend on the number of truth values n and are exponential in the number of different predicate symbols k. We show in Section 5 that much better bounds can be achieved for an interesting, non-trivial sub-case of the monadic fragments.
Undecidability of infinite-valued Gödel logics
We prove the undecidability of each Gödel logic G V , where the set V of truth values contains infinitely many values below some value that is distinct from 1. Our proof adapts and generalizes the undecidability proof sketched in [8] for monadic 'LC with constant domains', which coincides with monadic G [0, 1] . With the notable exception of G ↑ , all infinite-valued Gödel logics satisfy the above condition on V , see Corollary 1.
We will also consider infinite-valued Gödel logics extended with the projection operator . Monadic prenex G [0,1] was shown to be undecidable in [2] . This result is generalized below, where we show that in fact for all infinite V , monadic G V is undecidable, even when restricted to prenex formulas.
Theorem 2. Let
Proof. The classical theory CE of two equivalence relations ≡ 1 and ≡ 2 was shown to be undecidable in [14] . Let G V be any Gödel logic, where V satisfies the condition: ∃p ∈ V, p < 1, such that V p = {y ∈ V | y ≤ p} is infinite. We faithfully interpret CE in the monadic fragment of G V . The idea is to translate formulas of the form x ≡ i y into formulas P i (x) ↔ P i (y), i = 1, 2, of the monadic fragment of G V , where P 1 and P 2 are different unary predicate symbols. Without loss of generality, we can assume formulas in CE to be in prenex normal form. Let S be the following formula of this kind:
where each occurrence of ≡ is either ≡ 1 or ≡ 2 , and where Q * is a string (Q 1 z 1 ) . . . (Q n z n ) of n quantifier occurrences. I.e., for all i = 1, . . . , n, Q i ∈ {∀, ∃}, and z i denotes some variable. Let S be the following monadic formula:
where P is P 1 or P 2 , according to whether ≡ is ≡ 1 or ≡ 2 . We show that S is valid in CE if and only if S is valid in G V .
Let M = (D, v M ) be an interpretation of CE. By the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem we can assume D to be countable without loss of generality. We define a corresponding interpretation c}, where c ∈ D (i ∈ {1, 2}). Since V p = {y ∈ V | y ≤ p} is infinite and D is countable, we can take some subset W = {w 0 , w 1 , . . .} of V p as the set of (unique) indices in an enumeration E 
(⇐) Let I be an interpretation of G V , such that S I < 1. Then, for some conjunct of S (which without loss of generality we identify with the exhibited one) we have
This implies
j P (x j ) ↔ P (y j ) I = 1, since j P (x j ) ↔ P (y j ) I is either 1 or not greater than sup{v
By the definition of M(I) we have for all variables z, z : z ≡ i z M(I) = if and only if P i (z) ↔ P i (z ) I = 1 (i = 1, 2). Therefore j x j ≡ y j M(I) = and k u k ≡ v k M(I) = ⊥. Hence S M(I) = ⊥. Inductive case: Assuming that the claims hold for S and S , we have to show that they also hold for S 1 = (Qx)S and S 1 = (Qx)S , where Q ∈ {∃, ∀} and x denotes any variable.
Let
denotes an interpretation that is like M, except for assigning the domain element d to the variable x. By the induction hypothesis we have
are identical for all d ∈ D, except for the element assigned to x, since we required the underlying enumeration of equivalence classes to be the same for all Theorem 2 can be strengthened as follows, if we augment the language of our logics by the projection operator .
Theorem 3. Validity of monadic formulas in G V , where V is infinite, is undecidable. This already holds for prenex monadic formulas.
Proof. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 2, above, we translate classical formulas of the form x ≡ i y into formulas (P i (x) ↔ P i (y)) (i = 1, 2). More exactly, let S be a formula of CE, like in the proof of Theorem 2. Let the corresponding formula S , to be interpreted in G V , be
The proof that S is valid in CE if and only if S is valid in G V is analogous to that of the corresponding claim in Theorem 2. However, in defining I(M) we may now take any subset of (the infinite set) V as the set of indices in the underlying enumeration of equivalence classes E w k i . The reason for this is that, in any interpretation I, (P (x) ↔ P (y)) I = 0 if v I (P )(v I (x)) = v I (P )(v I (y)), and (P (x) ↔ P (y)) I = 1 otherwise. Hence S itself behaves like a classical formula, i.e., it always evaluates either to 0 or to 1 Consequently, it suffices that V is infinite to be able to encode different equivalence classes by different truth values in the required way.
Finally note that, in contrast to Theorem 2, S is a prenex formula. 2
Efficient decidability of untangled G ↑ and G n
As mentioned in the introduction, application oriented investigations draw our attention to monadic formulas that exhibit a restricted form of overlap between scopes of different quantifier occurrences. We propose to view quantifier scopes as being entangled in general, but untangled in the following case.
Definition 1.
A closed monadic formula F is called untangled if every subformula of F contains at most one free variable. Example 1. (∃y)((∀x)P (x) → Q(y)) and (∀y)((∃z)((∀x)P (x) ∨ Q(z)) → P (y)) are untangled, but (∃y)(∀x)(P (x) → Q(y)) and (∃x)(∃y)(P (x) ∧ P (y)) are not untangled.
The monadic fragment of classical logic was used in [12] to formalize the knowledge base of the medical expert system CADIAG-1, represented as (classical) IF-THEN rules. This formalization made it possible to prove the decidability of the consistency checking problem in CADIAG-1 and led to a simple algorithm to actually carry out such checks. An inspection of this application reveals that in fact only the untangled fragment of classical logic is needed for this purpose. In a many-valued context unary predicates are interpreted as fuzzy sets. This allows to formalize fuzzy IF-THEN rules in the untangled fragments of manyvalued logics (including Gödel logics). Therefore (efficient) decision procedures for these fragments are of particular interest for fuzzy expert systems.
Remember from Proposition 1 that most quantifier shift laws are valid in all Gödel logics. For the decidability proof, below, we have to apply also the two remaining quantifier shift laws, that are not valid, e.g., in G [0,1] , but are valid in G ↑ and in G n .
Proposition 3.
The following schemes, where x is not free in B, are valid in G ↑ and in G n , for n ≥ 2:
Proof. The underlying truth value set of G ↑ is V = {1} ∪ {1 − 1 k | k ≥ 1}. Therefore, for every formula A(x) and every interpretation I of G ↑ there exists an element e in the domain of I such that A(x) I[e/x] = inf distr I (A(x)), where I[e/x] is like I except (possibly) for assigning e to the variable x. Similarly, for every formula A(x) and every interpretation I either (∃x)A(x) I = 1 or there exists an element e in the domain of I such that A(x) I[e/x] = sup distr I (A(x) ). The validity of (11) and (12) follows directly from these observations. 2 Definition 2. We define contexts ('formulas with a place holder') inductively as follows (remember that ¬ and ↔ are derived connectives):
, (∀x)C, and (∃x)C are positive contexts, but (C → F ) is a negative context; -if C is a negative context and F is a formula then Proposition 4. In all Gödel logics without the following principles hold:
Proof. By induction on the complexity of C. The base case, where C is the empty context (and therefore positive) trivially holds.
We spell out two of the twelve different propositional cases of the induction step. The validity of A → B implies A I ≤ B I for every interpretation I. By the induction hypothesis we have C[A] 
where the only free occurrences of x in C are in A(x) and A(x) is not in the scope of any quantifier occurrence in C[A(x)]. The validity of these schemes is obtained by repeatedly applying the quantifier shift laws of Propositions 1 and 3 in combination with the context rules of Proposition 4. (This is possible only because the formulas are untangled; see Remark 4, below.) So far, we have shown that every untangled formula F can be transformed (in linear time) into a formula F that only contains weak quantifier occurrences, but is equivalent to F with respect to validity in G ↑ (and G n , see Remark 5, below). Let us call such a formula weak. To obtain a decision procedure, we finally prove that every weak formula G is valid if and only if it is satisfied by all interpretations, where the size of the domain is bounded by the number of constant symbols occurring in G.
Let I be an arbitrary interpretation and let d 1 , . . . , d n be the different constant symbols occurring in a weak formula G. Let I be the interpretation that is obtained from I by removing from the domain D of I all elements except those e ∈ D, where v I (d i ) = e for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. It remains to check that G I < 1 implies G I < 1. In other words: if there is a counter model for G, then there is already one with a restricted domain, as indicated. To this aim, note that the quantifier shift laws of Propositions 3 and 1 entail that every weak G is equivalent to a formula of the form (∃x)G (x), where G (x) is weak, too. Obviously, distr I (G (x)) ⊆ distr I (G (x)). Since Y ⊆ X implies sup X ≥ sup Y , we obtain G I = sup distr I (G (x)) ≥ sup distr I (G (x)) = G I . By repeating this argument for all (weak) quantifier occurrences, we obtain G I ≤ G I , as required.
Finally, remember that, in Gödel logics, it only depends on the relative order, but not on the absolute values of assigned truth values different from 0 and 1, whether a given interpretation satisfies a formula. This implies that the number of different interpretations with finite domain is bounded by the size of the domain and the number of relevant (unary) predicates symbols. Hence we have shown that validity for untangled G ↑ is decidable.
2 Remark 4. Note that, in proving the validity of (∀x)C[A(
− , we had to shift quantifiers in and out (depending on the type of context). But those shifts are only over closed subformulas. This is where the defining condition for untangled formulas is used. In contrast, quantifiers cannot be moved into the scope of other quantifiers, in general. Indeed, e.g., (∃y)(∀x)(P (y) ∧ Q(x)) entails (∃y)(P (y) ∧ Q(d)), which in turn entails (∀x)(∃y)(P (y) ∧ Q(x)). But the latter formula does not entail (∃y)(∀x)(P (y) ∧ Q(x)). Moreover, note that Proposition 3 only holds for G ↑ and for G n , n ≥ 2, but not for other Gödel logics.
The following statement can be directly extracted from the proof of Theorem 4. To see that the mentioned bound is tight consider a formula of the form
(∃x i )( It is well known that every propositional formula A is valid in G ↑ (which coincides with G ∞ in the propositional case) if and only if it is valid in G n+2 , where n is the number of different propositional variables in A (see, e.g., [11] ). Therefore one can reduce testing validity of untangled formulas in G ↑ Corollary 3. An untangled formula F is valid in G ↑ if and only if its translation Π(F ) is valid in propositional G (m+c)·k+2 , where m is the number of strong quantifier occurrences, c is the number of different constant symbols occurring in F , and k the number of different predicate symbols in F .
Testing validity is well known to be in co-NP for all finite-valued logics. Clearly, for every untangled F , the parameters m, c, and k are all linearly bounded by the size of F . Therefore Corollary 3 implies that testing validity for untangled formulas in G ↑ is in co-NP, as well. This should be contrasted with the fact that testing validity for arbitrary monadic formulas is NEXPTIME-hard already for classical logic, see [6] .
